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1 Introduction
 Despite the fact that Japan and the seas 
around it account for only about 1 percent of the 
Earth’s surface, approximately 10 percent of the 
world’s earthquakes of magnitude 8.0 or greater 
during the 20th century occurred in Japan or 
its vicinity, it shows Japan is one of the most 
earthquake-prone countries in the world. Japan is 
also a leader in earthquake disaster management.
Since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 
January 1995, various technologies for earthquake 
disaster management have been developed.
I n  M a r c h  2 0 0 5,  t h e  C e n t r a l  D i s a s t e r  
Management Council established an “Earthquake 
Disaster Management Reduction” that sets 
concrete goa ls  for d isaster mit igat ion by 
strategically and intensively promoting steps 
that  i nclude mak i ng hous i ng and publ ic  
faci l ities earthquake - resistant and tsunami 
countermeasures.
The strategy sets a clear goal of reducing 
by half over the next 10 years the probable 
deaths and economic damage from a Tokai 
Earthquake, which is possible at any time, or a 
Tohnankai/Nankai Earthquake, which appears 
likely during the first half of the 21st century.
We will now turn our attention to recent 
trends and future issues in earthquake disaster 
management in Japan.
2 What has been learned from
 the Great Hanshin-Awaji
 Earthquake and subsequent
 earthquakes
From the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 until 
the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, no 
major earthquake directly struck a large city in 
Japan. With advances in construction technology 
and so on, it was widely believed that major 
destruction would not occur in the event of an 
earthquake.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, however, 
caused the collapse of expressway overpasses and 
other damage that had been unanticipated and 
not thought possible.
2-1 Earthquakes with a seismic intensity of 6
 or greater occur in various parts of Japan
T h e  N i i g a t a - ke n - c hu e t s u  E a r t h q u a ke  
occurred in October 2004. It was the first major 
ear thquake since the Great Hanshin -Awaji 
Earthquake with a maximum seismic intensity 
of 7 on the Japanese scale. In addition, the 
Fukuoka -ken Seiho - oki Earthquake occurred 
in March 2005 in northern Kyushu, a site of 
little previous seismic activity. That earthquake 
registered a maximum seismic intensity of 6−. 
In addition, there is deep concern that a Tokai 
Earthquake, a Tohnankai/Nankai Earthquake, or 
an earthquake centered under Tokyo could be 
imminent.
The source regions of earthquakes and massive 
ocean trench earthquakes during the past 30 
years are depicted in Figure 1.
They have occurred throughout the country 
outside the probable source regions for a Tokai 
Earthquake, a Tohnankai/Nankai Earthquake or 
an earthquake directly under Tokyo.
T here  a re  approx i mate ly  2 ,0 0 0  ac t ive  
earthquake faults in Japan’s inland and coastal 
areas. The Headquarters for Earthquake Research 
Promotion has selected 98 fault zones where a 
major earthquake would cause serious social and 
economic effects. It promotes research on active 
faults.
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There are about 2,000 confirmed active faults, 
but several times that many unknown active 
faults may also exist. A major earthquake could 
occur almost anywhere, not only in the Tokai 
and Tohnankai/Nankai regions or directly under 
Tokyo.
2-2 Declining awareness of disaster preparedness
According to surveys of about 3,000 people 
aged 20 and older carried out by the Cabinet 
Office of Japan regarding disaster prevention, a 
high percentage took measures to prepare for 
a major earthquake immediately after the Great 
Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake, but awareness of 
disaster preparedness has declined with the 
passage of time. (See Figure 2.)
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a s  s h o w n  i n  F i g u r e  3 ,  
people’s greatest concerns in the event of a major 
earthquake are fire and collapsing buildings, 
followed by securing food and drinking water 
in the aftermath, road and bridge damage and 
congestion, and tsunamis, inundations, and 
broken levees, and so on.
The percentage that has secured furniture to 
Figure 1 : Source regions of earthquakes and massive ocean trench earthquakes during the past 30 years
source : 2005 White Paper on Disaster Management [1]
Figure 2 : Measures taken in preparation for a major earthquake (multiple responses) Unit: %
Source: Prepared by the STFC from “Survey on Disaster Preparedness”, Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan [2]
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prevent it from toppling or falling is also low, 
with respondents citing concern for appearance 
and lack of awareness of the need as reasons.
2-3 Evacuation of residents
The Paci f ic Plate subducts beneath the 
continental plate in Offshore Sanriku. The 
Sanriku coastline is a ria coast, so it is considered 
a tsunami-prone area where tsunamis tend to be 
large.
There were many dead and missing in past 
tsunamis such as that generated by the Meiji 
Sanriku Earthquake of 1896, the Showa Sanriku 
Earthquake of 1933, and the Chile Earthquake of 
1960.
In the May 2003 earthquake offshore from 
Miyagi Prefecture, seismic intensity levels of 4 to 
6− were registered along the Sanriku coast, but 
no tsunami occurred.
Figure 4 depicts the results of a survey on 
Figure 3 : Concerns in the event of a major earthquake (multiple responses) Unit: %
Source: Prepared by the STFC from “Survey on Disaster Preparedness”, Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan [2]
Figure 4 : Evacuation behavior of residents of Kesennuma City during the 2003 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake
Source: “Current conditions and issues in tsunami disaster management as seen in the 
evacuation behavior of residents: Awareness survey of Kesennuma City residents regarding the 
2003 Miyagi-ken-oki Earthquake” [3]
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evacuation in an administrative area that includes 
the tsunami danger zone in Kesennuma City, 
Miyagi Prefecture. Three thousand six hundred 
questionnaires, about 30 percent of those sent, 
were returned.
Referring to the earthquake, about 8 percent 
evacuated, while 40 percent responded that 
they never intended to evacuate. Even in a 
tsunami - prone area, few people evacuated 
voluntarily.
Furthermore, a September 2004 earthquake 
with a hypocenter of fshore f rom Tokaido 
registered a maximum seismic intensity of 5−. 
Within four to six minutes of the earthquake, the 
Japan Meteorological Agency issued a tsunami 
warning for 42 municipalities in Aichi, Mie, and 
Wakayama Prefectures. Twelve municipalities 
issued evacuation advisories, but few people 
actually got out.
T h i s  a r e a  i s  o n e  w h e r e  t r e m e n d o u s  
damage is feared in the event of a Tokai or 
Tohnankai/Nankai Earthquake, so promotion 
of disaster preparedness there is considered 
particularly necessary.
In recent years, many people have been getting 
their earthquake and evacuation information 
from television, government, and other sources, 
so disaster management measures that can be 
quickly translated into action without depending 
on receiving such information are an urgent task.
2-4 The effects of the new 1981
 earthquake-resistance design code
O ve r  6 ,4 0 0  p e op le  d i e d  i n  t he  G r e a t  
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The cause of death 
in most cases was collapsed buildings or toppled 
furniture.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the 
percentage of pre-1981 structures according to 
block-by-block data collected from the City of 
Kobe's property tax rolls, and the percentage of 
all buildings completely destroyed based on a 
survey by the City Planning Institute of Japan, and 
so on.
The percentage of buildings damaged that 
were built before 1981 was extremely high, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the new 
earthquake-resistance design code implemented 
Figure 5 : Block-by-block comparison of the percentage of all buildings completely destroyed
 and the percentage of buildings built before 1981
Source: Building Research Institute, “Damage to buildings from the Hyogo-ken-nanbu 
Earthquake and subsequent response” [4]
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in 1981.
O f  J ap a n’s  app r ox i m a t e l y  47  m i l l i o n  
households, 17.5 million were built before 1982. 
Of these, an estimated 11.5 mil l ion are not 
sufficiently resistant to earthquakes.
Making homes and buildings earthquake-resistant 
is effective not only in terms of saving lives, but 
also in mitigating fire damage and the number 
of f i res, reducing the need for rescue and 
first-aid activities related to collapsed structures, 
and preventing impediments to recovery and 
reconstruction.
In addition, in the September 2003 Tokachi-oki 
Earthquake, no damage was found at locations 
where measures such as equipment to prevent 
bridge collapses, soil stabilization to prevent 
l iquefaction, and earthquake retrofitting of 
wood and reinforced concrete structures had 
been carried out following the 1993 Kushiro-oki 
Earthquake and the 1994 Hokkaido - toho - oki 
Earthquake. This demonstrated the effectiveness 
of earthquake retrofitting.
2-5 Recovery and reconstruction following
 the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
Figure 6 depicts recovery and reconstruction 
following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
Recovery of lifelines and other urban functions 
was accomplished relatively quickly (electricity, 
6 days; telephones, 14 days; gas, 84 days; water, 
90 days; sewers, 93 days), but reconstruction of 
industry and housing took longer.
The Chuetsu Earthquake occurred after the 
floods of July 13 and the heavy rains of Typhoon 
No. 23 had loosened the ground, and aftershocks 
continued for a long time afterwards.
Immediately a f ter the ear thquake, some 
communities were cut off due to damaged roads. 
Evacuation of victims was therefore difficult, 
and delivery of emergency supplies and lifeline 
services were delayed.
Repair of roads used to supply daily necessities 
was therefore prioritized in order to quickly 
reestablish lifelines.
A July 2005 earthquake with its hypocenter in 
northwestern Chiba Prefecture was the first in 
Figure 6 : Days to repair and recovery following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
Source: National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention, “Reflecting earthquake research in earthquake response 
measures” [5]
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13 years to register a seismic intensity of 5 within 
Tokyo’s 23 wards. Partly because the earthquake 
occurred on a Saturday evening, it took some 
time to gather personnel, and repairs and 
inspections were delayed.
Approximately 64,000 elevators in Tokyo 
s topped r u n n i ng.  I n  a l mos t  ever y  ca se ,  
ea r thquake control  operat ion equ ipment 
functioned and the elevators went to the nearest 
floor, stopped, and opened their doors. Except for 
buildings that could not be entered for security 
reasons, expert technicians confirmed safety in 
order to prevent secondary accidents, and service 
was restored the following day. There were 
78 cases of people trapped in elevators, with 
an average time of about 50 minutes between 
receipt of notification and rescue. Apparently, 
emergency stop equipment engaged when door 
abnormalities were detected.
Elevators should be equipped on the inside 
with devices for manually opening doors, similar 
to the emergency doors on trains, so that people 
can escape safely.
In addition, considerable time was required 
before resuming railway operation. Japan Railway 
and subway lines were stopped for up to seven 
hours, affecting over 1 million people. Ways 
of reducing time until service resumption and 
providing information to passengers in the event 
of service disruptions are therefore being studied.
2-6 Earthquake prediction
Earthquake prediction is the forecasting of 
the time, location, and size (magnitude) of 
earthquakes before they occur. Forty years have 
passed since Japan’s Earthquake Prediction Plan 
began as a national project in 1965. Currently, the 
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion 
carries out long- term probability forecasting 
whereby it attempts to predict the probability 
of an earthquake occurring in the next 30 years. 
This is based on data such as intervals between 
occurrences, most recent activity, and so on.
For the crusta l deformation observation 
that is fundamental to earthquake prediction, 
nationwide instal lation of GPS continuous 
observation facilities at mesh of approximately 20 
kilometers has proceeded, enabling timely and 
accurate information to be obtained.
Earthquakes are considered to be associated 
with earthquake precursor phenomena, which 
a re  anoma lous  phenomena that  precede 
earthquakes.
The Japan Meteorological Agency believes 
that short-term prediction of a Tokai Earthquake 
is possible because, as shown in Figure 7, (1) 
there is a high likelihood it will be accompanied 
by precursor phenomena, (2) a measuring and 
Figure 7 : Model of the generation of a Tokai Earthquake
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency, “Information on Tokai Earthquake” [6]
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observation system that can detect precursor 
phenomena is in place directly above the source 
region, and (3) the “pre - slip model” provides 
standards for judging whether anomalies are true 
precursor phenomena.
In the September 2003 Tokachi-oki Earthquake, 
however, no pre-slip occurred.
Before a magnitude 7.3 Haicheng Earthquake 
that struck China’s Liaoning Province in February 
1975, precursor phenomena such as abnormal 
an imal behav ior and water gush ing f rom 
underground were observed. An evacuation order 
was issued just before the earthquake struck, 
enabling damage to be minimized.
When anomalous phenomena occur, however, 
it is difficult to determine if they are indeed 
earthquake precursor phenomena, and there 
are few other examples of successful short-term 
prediction.
3 Status of measures since
 the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
Learn ing f rom the Great Hanshin - Awaji  
Earthquake, Japan has undertaken new measures 
and strengthened and improved existing ones in 
order to mitigate earthquake damage.
3-1 Preparation of a seismic observation
 network
In the wake of the Great Hanshin - Awaji 
Earthquake, the legislator- initiated Earthquake 
Disaster Management Special Measures Act was 
passed in July 1995 to promote comprehensive 
measures for earthquake disaster management.
The Headquarters for Earthquake Research 
Promotion set forth “Basic Earthquakes Survey 
and Observation Plan” in August 1997.
For ear thquake observation, a system to 
centra l i ze and process data to the Japan 
Meteorological Agency was prepared. As shown 
in Table 1, a highly-sensitive broadband seismic 
observation network covers the entire country 
with a high degree of accuracy.
S e t u p  o f  t e r r e s t r i a l  h i g h - s e n s i t i v i t y  
seismographs (seismographs that detect very 
smal l vibrations that cannot be sensed by 
human beings) in 1,228 locations, at mesh of 
approximately 20 km, is nearly complete.
P l a c e m e n t  o f  t e r r e s t r i a l  b r o a d b a n d  
seismographs (seismographs that record surface 
vibrations over a wide range of frequencies, from 
fast vibrations to very slow ones) in 112 locations, 
at mesh of about 100 km, is almost complete.
Underground strong -motion seismographs 
(seismographs that monitor strong vibrations 
too great to be recorded by high - sensitivity 
seismographs) are in place at 975 locations, 
generally at the same sites as high- sensitivity 
seismographs. There are also 3,564 in surface 
locations, with an additional 2,800 belonging to 
local governments.
Placement of GPS continuous observation 
facilities (a system using satellites to monitor plate 
and crustal deformation) in 1,456 locations, at 
approximately 20-km mesh, is almost finished.
For seismic observation using cable - type 
seaf loor seismographs, existing facilities are 
being used, and work to select major areas in 
sequence and emplace new seismographs is 
underway.
Along with the replacement of the seafloor 
seismograph of f  Omaezak i,  placement of  
cable - type seafloor seismographs is necessary 
because of the urgency of the situation in the 
Tokai and Tohnankai/Nankai Earthquake regions.
3-2 Prompt communication of data obtained
 through seismic observation
Currently, data from seismic intensity indicators 
in every prefecture are connected to the Japan 
Meteorological Agency, which broadcasts a range 
of information to the public should a seismic 
event occur. The prefectures begin transmission 
of seismic intensity data within four minutes 
af ter an earthquake. Transmission from al l 
observatories is to be completed within nine 
minutes.
When large - scale damage is expected, a 
headquarters is formed in the Prime Minister’s 
Off ice and an emergency assembly team is 
convened.
During the July 2005 earthquake centered 
in northwestern Chiba Prefecture, the extra 
time taken due to slow processing by the Tokyo 
regional server that transmits data to the Japan 
Meteorological Agency led to delays in initial 
response. In the Niigata-ken-chuetsu Earthquake 
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as well, a breakdown in the seismic intensity 
data network occurred, making some of the 
transmissions to the Japan Meteorological Agency 
impossible.
3-3 Earthquake warning bulletins
As illustrated in Figure 8, earthquake warning 
bulletins work by detecting P waves (preliminary 
tremors), which have a high propagation velocity, 
at observatories near the hypocenter before the S 
waves (principal shock) that cause major shaking 
arrive, and estimating the hypocenter and scale of 
the earthquake, when the S waves will arrive, and 
the seismic intensity. This helps to prevent and 
reduce damage from earthquakes and tsunamis.
The Japan Meteorological Agency began testing 
earthquake warning bulletins in February 2004. 
Currently, bulletins are being provided to about 
Table 1 : List of seismic observation facilities (as of March 31, 2004)
Type High-sensitivityseismograph
Broadband
seismograph
Strong-motion 
seismograph Crustal deformation
Ocean floor crustal 
deformation
(ocean floor 
geodetics)
Ground
water
Geo
magnetic Gravity
Tide / 
tsunami
Supervising 
authority
Land
S
eafloor*
1
TY
P
E
1*
2
TY
P
E
2*
3
A
bove- 
ground
U
nder- 
ground
G
P
S
S
LR
V
LB
I
S
trainm
eters, 
etc.*
4
Ministry of 
Education, 
Culture, Sports, 
Science and 
Technology
41
National 
universities 273 6 (2) 10 26 116 9 59 104 42 42 3 5
National 
Research Institute 
for Earth Science 
and Disaster 
Prevention
755 6 (1) 22 51 1700 672 3 55 7 15 6
Japan Agency 
for Marine-Earth 
Science and 
Technology
5 (1) 4
Ministry of Land 
Infrastructure and 
Transport
1158 285 76
Geographical 
Survey Institute 1311 4 5 15 2 27
Japan 
Meteorological 
Agency
186*5 8 (2) 585 36 6 84*6
Hydrographic and 
Oceanographic 
Department, 
Japan Coast 
Guard
39 1 16 1 28
National Institute 
of Advanced 
Industrial Science 
and Technology
14 4 5 9 3 15 42 20
Total 1228 25 (7) 31*7 81 3564*8 975 1456 1 4 215 16 91 99 5 230*6
(*1) Number of cables is shown in parentheses.
(*2)  Broadband seismographs that cover frequency bands enabling analysis from free vibration to minor earthquakes (e.g., STS1 and 
CMG1T).
(*3)  Broadband seismographs that cover frequency bands enabling analysis of a range of seismic events from micro-earthquakes to 
tsunami earthquakes that have relatively short predominant periods (e.g., STS2 and CMG3T).
(*4)  Includes strainmeters, volume strainmeters, three-component strainmeters, tiltmeters, extensometers, etc.
(*5)  Among the Japan Meteorological Agency's high-sensitivity seismographs, there are 20 locations where seismographs with Type 2 
broadband performance are installed. Includes three at Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology facilities.
(*6)  Includes 10 observation points relying on other agencies (local governments, etc.) and 2 utilizing facilities belonging to other 
agencies.
(*7)  The Nemuro observatory is a joint facility of the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention and national 
universities.
(*8)  In addition, local public agencies have approximately 2,800 aboveground strong-motion seismographs.
Source: The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion [7]
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140 organizations, including national disaster 
management agencies, local governments, 
universities, schools, and the private sector.
Damage can be reduced by carrying out the 
following disaster management action before the 
principal shock arrives:
• Automatic control of trains, elevators, etc.
•  Avoidance of dangers by transmission to 
people in buildings, at local governments, etc.
•  Practical application of data transmission 
systems such as mobile phones and satellite 
communications
•  Damage mitigation by turning off electricity, 
gas, fuel to factory production lines, and other 
elements that can cause fires, and backing up 
important data.
Because of the minimal time lag between 
the P waves and S waves of an earthquake 
centered directly under a city, such as the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the bulletins are not 
effective for such earthquakes.
During the August 2005 earthquake offshore 
from Miyagi Prefecture, time from transmission 
of the initial earthquake warning bulletin until 
arrival of S waves was approximately 22 seconds 
in Kawasakimachi, Miyagi Prefecture, where 
the seismic intensity reached 6−. In the cities 
of Sendai and Ishinomaki, where the seismic 
intensity reached 5+, times from transmission 
until S wave arrival were 16 seconds and 10 
seconds, respectively.
3-4 The Act for Promotion of the Earthquake
 Proof Retrofit of Buildings 
 (Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion Act)
Based on the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake, Japan’s Diet passed the Act for 
Promotion of the Earthquake Proof Retrofit of 
Buildings (Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion 
Act) in December 1995 to work towards early 
retrof it t ing of bui ldings that do not meet 
earthquake-resistance codes.
Owners of designated buildings (schools, 
hospitals, theaters, department stores, offices, 
and other buildings of at least three stories and 
1,000 m2 where many people gather) must carry 
Figure 8 : Earthquake warning bulletins
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency materials [8]
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out earthquake -resistance inspections and, if 
necessary, carry out earthquake retrofitting. 
Ordinary homes are not included.
Almost 10 years have passed since the law went 
into effect, and although about 10,000 designated 
buildings have been retrofitted, not enough 
earthquake retrofitting has been carried out.
In 2004, therefore, parts of the Bui lding 
Standards Law and the Urban Planning Law were 
revised in order to ensure the safety of building 
and proper urban disaster management.
Partial revision of the Building Standards Law 
(ensuring building safety)
•  Enhancement and strengthening of the 
repor t i ng and i nspect ion systems for  
buildings
•  Issuing of directives to upgrade dangerous 
substandard buildings
•  Rationalization of regulations regarding 
existing substandard buildings
•  Strengthened pena lt ies (corporate tax 
penalties for not complying with directives to 
perform upgrades), etc.
Partial revision of the Urban Planning Law
•  Countermeasures for earthquakes and major 
fires in crowded urban areas, etc.
In order to strengthen measures for homes and 
buildings with insufficient earthquake resistance, 
designated buildings must undergo earthquake 
inspection and retrofitting within specified 
periods. Buildings with insufficient earthquake 
resistance are to receive not just guidance and 
advice, but also will receive instructions, be 
required to make reports, and submit to on-site 
inspection, and buildings that fail to comply 
will be publicly identified. Revisions to the 
Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion Act such 
as new provisions requiring action to be taken 
with respect to general housing are also under 
consideration.
3-5 Earthquake resistant, seismic isolation,
 and vibration suppression construction
There are three types of construction that 
raise the earthquake - resistance of buildings: 
“earthquake resistant construction,” “seismic 
i s o l a t ion  con s t r uc t ion ,”  a nd  “v ib r a t ion  
suppression construction.” Figure 9 explains 
these categories.
Earthquake resistant construction util izes 
studs, walls, and other structural elements 
to absorb seismic forces through elasticity or 
elastoplasticity.
Se i sm ic i solat ion const r uct ion ut i l i zes  
equipment such as bearings in foundations, 
between stories, and so on to absorb seismic 
energy and prevent buildings from shaking.
Vibration suppression construction utilizes 
suppression equipment such as dampers in walls 
to absorb seismic energy and control shaking of 
the entire building.
Earthquake resistant construction proved 
effective in the Great Kanto Earthquake. During 
Japan’s per iod of rapid economic growth, 
bui ldings became ta l ler, and in the 1980s 
vibration suppression construction increased 
mainly as a means of improving livability in 
high winds. Seismic isolation construction 
has increased since the Great Hanshin -Awaji 
Earthquake.
3-6 Making homes and buildings earthquake
 resistant
The cost  of  ear thquake retrof it t ing for 
single - family homes varies by the size of the 
house and the amount of work needed, but it 
averages ¥2 million per home.
Since the Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake, 
the following support system for earthquake 
i n s p e c t i o n s  a n d  r e t r o f i t t i n g  h a s  b e e n  
implemented to ease the cost burden.
•  Subsidy for ear thquake inspection and 
retrofitting of condominiums and offices, etc. 
(FY 1995)
•  Subs idy for  ea r thquake i nspect ion of  
single-family homes (FY 1998)
•  Subsidy for earthquake retrofitting of single 
family homes (FY 2002)
Ear thquake inspect ion and ret rof it t i ng 
of homes through FY 2003 totaled 170,000 
inspections (160,000 subsidized), and 3,500 
retrofits (40 subsidized). The system is not being 
sufficiently utilized.
Because the above system was not sufficiently 
ut i l i zed ,  the  ea r thquake i nspect ion and 
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retrofitting support systems were unified through 
the establ ishment of a home and bui lding 
earthquake retrofitting program in FY 2005.
T he  prog r a m mu s t  be  i nt roduced  a nd  
implemented throughout Japan.
3-7 Earthquake insurance
Because the potential damage from earthquakes 
is so large, it is di f f icult for private - sector 
insurance companies to bear the risk alone.
Fol lowing the 1964 Ni igata Ear thquake, 
therefore, the Act for Earthquake Insurance 
was passed in 1966 to establish an insurance 
system jointly operated by the government and 
private-sector insurance companies.
When insurance claims for a single earthquake 
reach a certain level, the government pays a 
portion of such claims. Since April 2005, the limit 
per earthquake has been ¥5 trillion (a possibility 
in an earthquake on the scale of the Great Kanto 
Earthquake).
Earthquake insurance is incidental to fire 
insurance, and is limited to ¥50 million for the 
structure and ¥10 million for household goods, 
30-50 percent of fire insurance coverage.
Premiums are decided according to date of 
Figure 9 : Categories of earthquake resistant, seismic isolation, and vibration suppression construction
Source: Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport [9]
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construction, wood or non-wood construction, 
and risk by prefecture (four categories).
As of the end of FY 2003, earthquake insurance 
was attached to about 35 percent of fire insurance 
policies.
A bout  17  pe rcent  o f  hou sehold s  h ave  
e a r t hqu a ke  i n s u r a nce .  I nc lud i ng  J apa n  
Agr icu ltu re Cooperat ives  i nsu rance,  the 
enrollment rate is still only about 30 percent. 
Promoting the spread of earthquake insurance is 
a current issue.
3-8 Hazard maps
Hazard maps are intended to keep disaster 
damage to a minimum. A long with clearly 
depicting expected damage zones and degrees 
of damage on maps, they present evacuation 
information such as shelters and danger zones in 
an easy-to-understand format.
Earthquake hazard maps have been prepared 
for Tokyo and six cities including Yokohama and 
Nagoya. Tsunami hazard maps have been created 
for only 122 of Japan’s coastal municipalities, 
about 12 percent of the total of 991. The Central 
Disaster Management Council raised the issue 
of the creation of tsunami hazard maps within 
the next five years for all municipalities that 
need to introduce tsunami disaster management 
measures.
Most hazard maps created and published to 
date indicate schools, community centers, and 
other evacuation points, but few show escape 
routes or designated evacuation routes.
3-9 Disaster recovery and reconstruction
According to the Basic Disaster Management 
Plan ( July 2005, Central Disaster Management 
Counci l), “Recovery and reconstruction of 
affected areas has the aim of supporting victims 
in putting their lives back in order, working 
towards recovery of facilities with the focus on 
the prevention of repeat disasters, and providing 
the basic conditions for local development from 
the perspective of improving safety. In addition, 
the promptest and smoothest possible recovery 
and reconstruction should be implemented in 
light of reduced socioeconomic activity in the 
community because of the disaster.”
Based on the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake, the following measures are in place.
(1) Revision of laws and plans
(i)  Amendment of the Disaster Countermeasures 
Basic Act
Revisions enhancing and strengthening the 
functions and operations of government disaster 
management headquar ters by relaxing the 
conditions for establishing the Headquarters for 
Urgent Disaster Management led by the Prime 
Minister and establishing the On-site Disaster 
Management Headquarters as a legal entity have 
been implemented. Local government disaster 
management has been strengthened by allowing 
mayors to call upon prefectural governors to ask 
for the aid of the Self-Defense Forces.
(ii)  Revision of the Basic Disaster Management 
Plan and the Local Disaster Management Plan
The earthquake section of the Basic Disaster 
Management Plan, the most important plan in 
the disaster management sector, was completely 
revised.
In addition, the comprehensive plans for local 
areas (the Local Disaster Management Plan) 
were also revised in each prefecture in light 
of the complete revision of the Basic Disaster 
Management Plan. As of Apri l 2004, 2,390 
municipal governments (76.5 percent of the 
whole) had completed their revisions.
(iii) The Act Concerning Support for Reconstructing 
Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
Natural disasters can cause very significant 
damage to livelihoods. For victims who face 
difficulties rebuilding their lives and regaining 
their independence due to economic or other 
factors, prefectures can use funds contributed 
from a mutual aid perspective to help the victims 
regain their independence. The law was passed 
and implemented in 1998. In 2004, it was revised 
to relax the conditions for its application and to 
increase the maximum payment amount.
(2) Securing lifelines
Li fel ines are directly related not only to 
recovery and reconstruction, but also to ending 
evacuee conditions.
Securing personnel to work on recovery 
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and reconstr uct ion i s  impor tant,  but  for  
improved earthquake resistance for facilities 
and qu ick restorat ion of funct ion a f ter a 
disaster, establishment of earthquake inspection 
technology and retrofitting methods for existing 
faci l ities and research and development of 
technology for prompt discover y of areas 
damaged in a disaster are also necessary.
In addition, during recovery and reconstruction 
checks, wiring and pipes must be decentralized 
t h roug h  sec t ion i ng  o f f ,  dupl ica t i ng ,  o r  
networking.
(i) Electricity
After the Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake, 
44 electrical f ires broke out. Public service 
announcements urging people to turn of f 
circuit breakers before evacuating are being 
implemented, but circuit breakers need to be 
constructed such that they will remain off even 
after electricity is restored until a confirmation 
button is pushed.
(ii) Gas
For city gas, microcomputer-equipped meters 
that shut off when an earthquake is sensed have 
been required since the Great Hanshin -Awaji 
Earthquake. They functioned effectively during 
the Chuetsu Earthquake, preventing secondary 
damage. An automatic shutoff system linked to 
earthquake warning bulletins is needed for liquid 
propane gas as well.
(iii) Water
Many water pipes have been weakened by the 
use of asbestos-cement materials or have been in 
place more than 20 years, so pipe connections 
joints do not withstand earthquakes well. The 
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake caused about 
900,000 homes, mainly in Kobe, to lose water 
service. Currently, waterlines are being made 
earthquake resistant with ductile cast-iron pipes 
with earthquake - resistant joints, steel pipes, 
polyethylene pipes, and so on.
(iv) Sewers
Sewage facilities such as treatment plants, 
pumping stations, and pipelines constructed 
since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake are 
generally earthquake resistant. For joints, very 
elastic and watertight expanding and f lexible 
joints are used, and monitoring of sewer damage 
status through remote-control television cameras 
is progressing. Sewer services are restored in 
conjunction with recovery work on waterlines.
3-10 Research and development budgets
 for science and technology related to
 disaster management
Japan’s disaster management countermeasures, 
including those for natural disasters, are based 
on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, 
which was passed in 1961 in the aftermath of the 
Typhoon Ise-wan of 1959.
In recent years, research and development on 
technology related to disaster management has 
Figure 10 : Research budget for science and technology related to disaster management in Japan (unit: ¥100 million)
Source: Prepared by the STFC from White Paper on Disaster Management [1]
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proceeded in accordance with the 1993 Basic 
Plan for Research and Development on Disaster 
Prevention (December 1993, decided by the 
Prime Minister).
Following the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 
the Headquarters for Ear thquake Research 
P romot ion  wa s  e s t ab l i shed  a s  a  spec i a l  
government organ in July 1995. It carries out 
earthquake-related observation, measurement, 
surveys, and research.
Changes over time in the budget for science 
and technology research related to disaster 
management, including on natural disaster 
countermeasure technology, are depicted in 
Figure 10.
The trend has been upward since 1970s. The 
decline since FY 2001 is due to the shift to 
independent administrative institutions.
4 Current and future issues
In order to reduce earthquake damage, the 
following issues should be addressed.
4-1 Completion of a seafloor seismograph
 network
Development of the seismograph observation 
network based on the 1997 Basic Earthquakes 
Survey and Observation Plan is nearly complete.
However, because movement of the earth’s crust 
occurs where it cannot be seen, underground 
and under the ocean, away from monitoring 
instruments, analysis of waveforms and scale 
data by monitoring earthquakes on the sea floor 
immediately after they happen is essential to 
reducing earthquake damage.
If seismographs are placed essential ly to 
surround a hypocenter, seismic activity can 
be monitored with a high degree of accuracy. 
Because monitoring ocean seismic activity from 
the land reduces observation accuracy, real-time 
continuous monitoring at sea is imperative.
Completion of a seafloor seismograph network 
is necessary not only because direct observations 
of seismic activity at sea would contribute to 
collection of earthquake and tsunami data, it 
would also lead to damage mitigation through 
earthquake warning bulletins.
4-2 Replacement of seismographs and
 improvement of the reception system
Seismographs need to be replaced every 10 
years, and the instruments emplaced following 
the Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake are now 
almost 10 years old.
Local governments have set up approximately 
2,800 seismic intensity indicators all over Japan. 
The Chuetsu Earthquake’s seismic intensity of 
7 was recorded by Kawaguchimachi's seismic 
intensity indicator. However, the consolidation 
of municipalities has led to the elimination 
and consol idat ion of seismographs, whi le 
reduced funding has led to reductions in routine 
maintenance, possibly lowering the accuracy of 
measurement.
The seismic intensity indicators of local 
governments not only collect seismic data, they 
also are used for the prompt initial responses 
of relevant government agencies, including the 
headquarters in the Prime Minister's Office.
In addition, the system must be immediately 
improved through measures such as increasing 
the number of network lines, multiplexing and 
continuous connection, enhanced processing 
capacity for transmission and reception servers so 
that municipalities and prefectures can respond 
to seismic intensity bulletins.
4-3 Establishment of preferential treatment to
 promote earthquake resistance
The Central Disaster Management Council's 
Earthquake Disaster Management Reduction 
sets forth the concrete goal of increasing the 
percentage of earthquake-resistant housing from 
the current 75 percent to 90 percent over the 
next 10 years.
However, the high costs of inspection for 
earthquake resistance and earthquake retrofitting, 
as well as the proliferation of unscrupulous 
contractors, have been obstacles to achieving this 
goal. Householder’s overconfidence in the safety 
of their homes can also be seen.
Unif ication of the earthquake inspection 
and retrofitting systems should help promote 
earthquake resistance, but earthquake retrofitting 
can raise property values, leading to higher 
property taxes.
Preferential treatment for disaster mitigation 
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measures, such as reduced property taxes for 
earthquake - resistant structures, discounted 
earthquake insurance premiums, and so on, 
should be adopted.
Promoting measures to make structures 
ear thquake - resistant should be pr ior it ized 
according to the degree of danger based on 
hazard maps, risk by prefecture for earthquake 
insurance, and so on.
4-4 Creation and distribution of hazard maps
Municipalities are the primary agents for 
the implementation of disaster management 
measures. They play a major role that includes 
ordering the dispatch of fire and police units, 
issuing evacuation advisories and orders to 
residents, establishing danger zones.
Hazard maps that not only predict tsunamis 
and landsl ides caused by ear thquakes, but 
also indicate possible locations of disrupted 
transportation networks and collapsed or burning 
buildings and allow evacuees to be promptly 
directed to safe locations must be created and 
distributed.
When revising the Local Disaster Management 
Plan due to consolidation, some municipalities 
were unable to undertake the creation of hazard 
maps.
Hazard maps not only provide information 
of damage risk, evacuation sites, escape routes, 
and so on, they are also useful when considering 
facilities improvements such as preventative and 
emergency measures.
In addition, at the urban planning stage, roads 
should be made wide as a measure to prevent 
fires from spreading.
4-5 Promotion of multipurpose conduits
I n e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n  t h e  r e c o v e r y  a n d  
reconstruction of lifelines following the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake were noted. These 
included the digging up of roads to repair gas 
lines, followed later by the digging up the same 
roads again to repair water mains.
Methods to share in formation regarding 
damage and recovery and to work cooperatively 
on reconstruction of various lifelines must be 
established.
Placement of lifelines such as electricity, gas, 
and water in multipurpose conduits under roads 
is advancing. By securing sufficient maintenance 
space in the multipurpose conduits, not only 
is the safety of lifelines during an earthquake 
improved, but traffic problems can be reduced 
because there is no need to dig up roads several 
times to repair the different lifelines.
Many l i fel ines suffered heavy damage in 
the Great Hansh in - Awaji  Ear thquake, but 
multipurpose conduits in a certain part of Kobe 
received only minor damage. Urban renewal that 
better resists earthquakes should be promoted.
5 Conclusion
Ever since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 
people have been calling for disaster management 
that reduces damage.
Promotion of effective action on disaster 
mitigation issues such as those described above 
must be promoted.
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